The Washington Accord: A Step Toward Peace in the DRC-Rwanda Conflict

Introduction

On June 27, 2025, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Olivier Nduhungirehe and Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, signed the Washington Accord in Washington, D.C., under the mediation of the United States, with support from Qatar, the African Union, and Togo. Hailed by U.S. President Donald Trump as a “glorious triumph,” the agreement aims to end decades of conflict in eastern DRC, rooted in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which has claimed approximately 6 million lives and displaced over 7 million people. The accord promises Rwandan troop withdrawal, the neutralization of militias like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and a regional economic integration framework to foster licit mineral trade. However, significant challenges, including the exclusion of the M23 rebel group and vague enforcement mechanisms, raise questions about its durability. This article examines the accord’s provisions, stakeholder reactions, and prospects for lasting peace, drawing on voices from both Rwanda and the DRC.

Key Provisions of the Washington Accord

The Washington Accord builds on a Declaration of Principles signed on April 25, 2025, and incorporates elements of the 2024 Harmonized Plan (CONOPS) from the Luanda Process. Its core provisions include:

1. Cessation of Hostilities and Troop Withdrawal: Rwanda commits to withdrawing its estimated 4,000–7,000 troops from eastern DRC within 90 days, while the DRC pledges to neutralize the FDLR, a Hutu militia linked to the 1994 genocide. Both parties agree to respect territorial integrity and halt support for non-state armed groups, including the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels.
2. Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM): A bilateral mechanism, to be launched within 30 days of signing, will oversee troop withdrawals, FDLR neutralization, and dispute resolution. The JSCM is intended to ensure compliance, with monthly meetings alternating between the DRC and Rwanda.
3. Disarmament and Integration: The accord calls for the disengagement, disarmament, and conditional integration of armed groups, including M23, into the DRC’s security forces. Reintegration is to be rigorous, based on individual vetting for loyalty and adherence to international humanitarian law.
4. Humanitarian Access and Refugee Return: The agreement prioritizes safe, voluntary, and dignified returns for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), with over 7 million displaced in the DRC. It also ensures free humanitarian access, coordinated with local authorities and the UN mission (MONUSCO).
5. Economic Integration Framework: Within 90 days, Rwanda and the DRC are to establish a framework to promote licit commerce in critical minerals (e.g., cobalt, copper, tantalum, gold, lithium), blocking illicit pathways and encouraging U.S. investment to counter China’s dominance in the region’s mineral trade. Specific projects include the Ruzizi III hydropower project and Lake Kivu methane exploitation.
6. Monitoring and Oversight: The U.S., Qatar, the African Union, and Togo form a joint oversight committee to monitor implementation, with the first meeting held on July 31, 2025, in Washington.

Economic and Geopolitical Framing

President Trump tied the peace deal to U.S. strategic interests, particularly securing access to the DRC’s $24 trillion in critical minerals (e.g., cobalt, copper, lithium) to counter China’s influence in Africa. He claimed the U.S. would gain “a lot of the mineral rights from the Congo,” framing the accord as a “minerals-for-security” deal. The agreement’s regional economic integration framework, to be launched within 90 days, aims to foster licit mineral trade with U.S. investors, potentially linking to projects like the Lobito Corridor. This focus aligned with the DRC’s outreach to Trump in February 2025, when Tshisekedi offered mineral access in exchange for security assistance against M23.

Pressure and Enforcement:

President Trump emphasized compliance, warning of “very severe penalties, financial and otherwise” for violations, though he provided no specifics. This rhetoric aimed to address concerns about past unimplemented agreements, with the U.S., Qatar, the African Union, and Togo forming a joint oversight committee to monitor progress. His administration navigated contentious issues, such as the DRC’s initial demand for immediate Rwandan troop withdrawal, which was softened to a 90-day timeline to secure Rwanda’s agreement.

Collaboration with Qatar and Regional Actors:

President Trump’s team worked closely with Qatar, which initiated de-escalation efforts in March 2025 by hosting Tshisekedi and Kagame in Doha. Qatar’s influence, driven by investments like Kigali’s new airport, complemented U.S. efforts, with parallel M23-DRC talks in Doha addressing the rebel group’s exclusion from the main accord. The African Union and Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé were also involved, ensuring regional buy-in, though the U.S. took the lead in finalizing the deal.

Stakeholder Reactions: Hope Tempered by Skepticism

Rwandan Perspectives

Rwandan officials have expressed cautious optimism about the accord. Foreign Minister Nduhungirehe called it a “turning point,” emphasizing its potential to address Rwanda’s security concerns, particularly the threat posed by the FDLR, which Kigali accuses the DRC of tolerating. He underscored U.S. mediation as critical, noting that the treaty “would not have been possible” without President Trump’s leadership, and publicly supported the idea of Trump receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. However, Nduhungirehe also highlighted “a great deal of uncertainty” due to the history of unimplemented agreements, signaling wariness about the DRC’s commitment to neutralizing the FDLR. Rwanda’s government views the economic framework positively, as it aligns with Kigali’s ambitions to process minerals like tungsten and tantalum legally, potentially integrating with the U.S.-backed Lobito Corridor. While public sentiment in Rwanda is less documented, the government’s narrative frames the accord as a diplomatic victory that strengthens regional stability without admitting to M23 support, which Rwanda officially denies.

Congolese Perspectives

Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi expressed his intention to nominate Trump for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation efforts in the Rwanda-DRC peace deal. African reporter Hariana Veras, a White House correspondent based in the DRC, informed Trump during a June 27, 2025, event that Tshisekedi was considering the nomination, stating, “President Félix Tshisekedi is thinking of nominating you for the Nobel Peace Prize. You deserve it.” Veras further noted Tshisekedi’s comments to local media, where he said, “If President Trump can mediate and put an end to this war, he deserves the Nobel Prize,” highlighting that previous U.S. presidents had overlooked the conflict. Tshisekedi’s office later confirmed this intent, framing the nomination as recognition of Trump’s role in securing a deal aimed at ending one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts.

Public opinion in the DRC is mixed, reflecting hope, frustration, and skepticism. Foreign Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner described the signing as a moment “long in coming,” expressing hope that it could restore “safety, dignity, and a sense of future” for Congolese citizens. President Félix Tshisekedi’s office hailed the accord as “another diplomatic success” and “the most important in over 30 years,” framing it as a testament to his leadership. However, grassroots and expert voices are less sanguine. In Goma, residents question the accord’s legitimacy due to the exclusion of M23, with one asking, “How can they say they sign for peace, yet they have not involved M23?” Former President Joseph Kabila dismissed the deal as “diplomatic theater,” criticizing the absence of M23 and other eastern Congolese groups. Congolese Nobel Peace Prize winner Denis Mukwege called the mediation process “opaque” and warned that it risks “legitimizing the plundering of Congolese natural resources” by prioritizing economic deals over justice and reparations. Analysts like Christian Moleka of the Congolese think tank Dypol view the accord as a “major turning point” but caution that it “in no way eliminates all the issues of the conflict.” Moleka argues that lasting peace requires structural reforms in the DRC’s security apparatus and sustained international support. Onesphore Sematumba of the International Crisis Group noted the “record time” of U.S. and Qatari mediation but warned that “the road can be long” between signing and achieving peace, especially given M23’s non-participation. Hope Muhinuka, an activist from North Kivu, expressed distrust in U.S. motives, stating, “It is up to us to capitalize on all we have now as an opportunity,” emphasizing local agency over foreign intervention.

Gabon: Gabonese President Brice Oligui Nguema also endorsed Trump’s nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, praising his efforts in central Africa. Nguema stated, “He is now bringing peace back to a region where that was never possible so I believe that he does deserve a Nobel Peace Prize. That is my opinion.” While not a formal nomination, this public support from another African leader underscores the regional recognition of Trump’s role.

Opportunities for Peace

The Washington Accord offers several opportunities to break the cycle of violence in eastern DRC:

1. Diplomatic Momentum: The involvement of global powers like the U.S. and Qatar, alongside regional actors like the African Union and Togo, signals unprecedented international attention to a conflict often overlooked. This could pressure both parties to adhere to commitments, especially with the joint oversight committee’s monitoring role.
2. Economic Incentives: The regional economic framework could transform illicit mineral trade into legitimate commerce, benefiting both nations. Rwanda’s processing capabilities and the DRC’s vast mineral reserves (estimated at $24 trillion by the U.S. Department of Commerce) could attract Western investment, fostering economic interdependence and reducing conflict incentives.
3. Security Coordination: The JSCM provides a structured platform for Rwanda and the DRC to address mutual security concerns, such as the FDLR and M23, potentially reducing mistrust. If implemented effectively, it could prevent escalations and facilitate troop withdrawals.
4. Humanitarian Relief: Commitments to refugee returns and humanitarian access could alleviate the suffering of over 7 million displaced people, building grassroots support for peace.

Challenges and Risks

Despite its promise, the accord faces significant hurdles:

1. Exclusion of M23: The absence of the M23 rebel group, which controls key cities like Goma and Bukavu, will likely present challenges to the implementation of the deal. M23’s leader, Corneille Nangaa of the Congo River Alliance, declared that “anything regarding us which is done without us, it’s against us,” signaling potential resistance. Separate Qatar-mediated talks in Doha between the DRC and M23 have not yet yielded a comprehensive agreement, complicating implementation. The U.S. recognizes M23 as a “rebel group” though has not labeled it a terrorist group. However, the DRC’s strong reluctance to include M23 in discussions likely led to America’s decision not to include them in talks.
2. Implementation Delays: As of August 19, 2025, the JSCM has not convened within the promised 30 days, and Rwandan troop withdrawals and FDLR operations have yet to begin. Historical failures of peace agreements, as noted by Nduhungirehe and Moleka, fuel skepticism about follow-through.
3. Economic Exploitation Concerns: The accord’s economic framework, particularly U.S. interest in mineral access, has sparked accusations of neo-colonialism. Mukwege and others argue that it prioritizes foreign interests over Congolese sovereignty and justice for victims. Posts on X reflect similar sentiments, with some calling the deal a “ruse” that strengthens Rwanda and M23.
4. Ongoing Violence: Despite the accord, M23 and other groups, including the Wazalendo militia, have strengthened their positions, with fighting continuing in eastern DRC. This undermines confidence in the ceasefire and highlights the challenge of enforcing disarmament.
5. Justice and Accountability Gaps: The accord’s silence on war crimes and reparations, as highlighted by Mukwege and Moleka, risks alienating victims and perpetuating grievances. Without addressing justice, the deal may achieve a “precarious and fragile peace” rather than a lasting one. This was likely another concession made by all sides in an effort to get a deal done.

Policy Recommendations

To maximize the Washington Accord’s potential, stakeholders should consider the following:

1. Strengthen Monitoring and Enforcement: The joint oversight committee must establish clear timelines and penalties for non-compliance, as hinted by Trump’s warning of “severe penalties, financial and otherwise.” The African Union, with Angola’s mediation experience, should take a lead role to ensure regional ownership.
2. Address Justice and Reparations: Incorporate mechanisms for accountability, such as truth and reconciliation processes or reparations funds, to address Mukwege’s concerns and build local trust.
3. Enhance Local Reforms: The DRC must undertake structural security reforms, as suggested by Moleka, to improve governance and reduce corruption (the DRC ranks 154th out of 164 in the 2025 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ legal subindex). This is critical for leveraging economic benefits for Congolese citizens.
4. Balance Economic Interests: The U.S. should ensure that mineral deals prioritize local development over extraction, addressing concerns about exploitation. Transparent agreements linked to the Lobito Corridor could model responsible investment.

Conclusion

The Washington Accord represents a historic opportunity to end one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts, with Rwanda and the DRC committing to troop withdrawals, militia neutralization, and economic cooperation. Rwandan officials see it as a security and economic win, while Congolese leaders like Wagner and Tshisekedi view it as a diplomatic milestone, though local and expert voices express skepticism about its exclusion of M23 and focus on minerals. Like most negotiations, the Washington Accord made some significant concessions in order to get a deal done. However, even a fragile peace deal is better than no deal, particularly in a deadly, destructive, long-standing conflict such as the one between DRC and Rwanda. The accord’s success hinges on addressing these gaps, ensuring robust implementation, and prioritizing justice alongside economic gains. As Crisis Group’s Richard Moncrieff notes, “significant responsibility” lies with Washington and Doha to monitor compliance, but regional actors and local reforms will ultimately determine whether this deal marks a turning point or another failed attempt at peace. For the people of eastern DRC, the true measure of success will be tangible improvements in safety, dignity, and opportunity—outcomes that remain uncertain but not unattainable.